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Abstract
Failures of cooperation cause many of society’s gravest problems. It
is well known that cooperation among many players faced with a social
dilemma can be maintained thanks to the possibility of punishment, but
achieving the initial state of widespread cooperation is often much more
difficult. We show here that there exist strategies of ‘targeted punishment’
whereby a small number of punishers can shift a population of defectors
into a state of global cooperation. The heterogeneity of players, often
regarded as an obstacle, can in fact boost the mechanism’s effectivity.
We conclude by outlining how the international community could use a
strategy of this kind to combat climate change.
1 Introduction
When Svante Arrhenius enunciated his greenhouse law in 1896, atmospheric
concentration of CO2 stood at its highest in over half a million years – about
300 ppm [1, 2]. It has now surpassed 400 ppm [3]. Our continued failure to avoid
the well-known consequences of global warming is not rooted in some technical
impossibility, but in a lack of international cooperation [4, 5]. It is a classic
example of the ‘tragedy of the commons’, as popularised by Garrett Hardin
through the metaphor of herdsmen with access to common pasture land: each
can always prosper individually by adding another head of cattle to his herd,
but eventually this leads to overgrazing and ruin for all [6, 7]. Other instances
include overfishing, deforestation, and many kinds of pollution. The solution
advocated by Hardin was “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon”, which is
usually taken to mean coercion by a Hobbesian central authority [8]. Some
argue that an alternative option is to privatise the commons [9], although the
coercion is still implicit in the assumption that property rights can be enforced
[10]. Ironically perhaps, it is in local communities with access to some resource
similar to Hardin’s common pasture land where self-organization to cooperate
has often been documented [11, 12]. And indeed, such cases usually involve
rules, mutually agreed upon, and enforced by the possibility of some form of
punishment [13].
In game theory, the tragedy of the commons is seen as a Nash equilibrium,
where no rational agent cooperates despite its being the strategy which would
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maximise collective payoff if adopted by all players [14]. Since cooperation
is, nevertheless, pervasive in nature and society, much theoretical and empirical
work has gone into understanding why this might be so [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
The focus has been on behaviour in the face of ‘social dilemmas’ – situations
where there is some communal benefit in choosing a cooperative strategy, but
also a temptation to defect (not cooperate). In one-to-one games such as the
prisoner’s dilemma, a strategy of conditional cooperation can be individually
advantageous if the game is iterated and players are able to remember each other
[15, 22]. A better model for commons management, however, is the public goods
game [23, 24]. Each player can choose how many tokens to put into a common
pot which multiplies the total amount by some factor (greater than one and
smaller than the number of players), and redistributes the result equally among
all players. Many experiments with humans have shown that cooperation (i.e.
adding to the pool) can be enhanced by allowing players to punish defectors,
despite the punisher incurring a cost for doing so [18, 25].
One aspect of social dilemmas which is not usually taken into account in
theoretical studies is the heterogeneity of players [17]: even in lab experiments
where the small number of subjects are all students, significantly different atti-
tudes to cooperation are found [18]. In cases where the players are nation states,
the differences are much larger. When it comes to tackling global warming, for
instance, the heterogeneity in gross and per capita emissions, vulnerability to cli-
mate change, dependence on fossil fuels, historical responsibility, technical and
financial ability to adapt, and many other relevant variables is widely regarded
as confounding the problem [4, 5].
When public goods experiments are run in the lab, with the same group
of subjects playing iteratively, cooperation tends to be high at first and grad-
ually dwindle thereafter, possibly as cooperators become frustrated with the
behaviour of defectors [18]. Allowing players to punish defectors from the start
in such settings can discourage would-be defectors and maintain cooperation. In
the real world, however, the problem is often not just one of maintaining cooper-
ation, but of achieving it in an environment of almost ubiquitous defection. For
instance, in a society with very little corruption, maintaining this happy state
is relatively easy, since anyone attempting to break the rules would swiftly be
identified and punished. In an environment of entrenched corruption, however,
there are usually too many defectors and too few resources to change the state
of affairs [26].
It is often assumed that punishment – and indeed positive incentives – must
be seen as fair, and there is some evidence that unfair or inconsistent punish-
ment fails to maintain cooperation in lab experiments [27]. But in situations
of widespread defection, the punishing capacity of would-be punishers (usually
a subset of cooperators), if applied equally to all defectors, can be too dilute
to have any effect. Here we use a simple model to show how, in such situa-
tions, there exist strategies of ‘targeted punishment’ which punishers can adopt
in order to escape the tragedy of the commons and bring about universal co-
operation. Far from being an obstacle, the existence of heterogeneity among
the players contributes to the strategy’s effectivity, and may, perhaps, serve to
assuage any feelings of unfairness.
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2 Results
2.1 Maintaining vs achieving cooperation
Let us consider a set of N players faced with a social dilemma of some kind.
At any given moment, each player can choose either to cooperate or to defect.
Depending on the details of the situation, a player will perceive a net payoff
associated with each strategy. Let us call the difference of these perceived
payoffs Hi for player i. Thus, if i has all the relevant information, and is
entirely selfish and rational, she will cooperate if Hi > 0 and defect is Hi < 0.
We shall consider, however, that the degree to which these assumptions hold
can be captured by a ‘rationality’ parameter β, in such a way that i has, at each
time step t, a probability Pi of cooperating and a probability 1−Pi of defecting,
where
Pi =
1
2
[tanh(βHi) + 1]. (1)
This sigmoidal form coincides with the transition probabilities for the spins in
an Ising model, and for the neurons in a Hopfield neural network [28]. Behaviour
is completely random if β = 0, and becomes deterministic (perfectly rational)
when β →∞. The need to take this feature into account is suggested by work
in evolutionary game theory and behavioural economics which has highlighted
the importance of somewhat stochastic or bounded rationality [29, 30, 31].
What form shall we choose for Hi? We are interested in situations where, in
the absence of interaction with the rest of the population, most of the players are
predisposed to defect. However, these predispositions can be heterogeneously
distributed. Let us assume, with no loss of generality, that the sequence i =
1, 2, ...N positions the players in order of their predisposition, from most to least
intrinsically cooperative. For simplicity, let us consider that the predisposition
hi of player i is given by the linear expression hi = −(i− 2)/(N − 2). Thus, for
any N , the first player is the only one with a slight tendency to cooperate, the
second one has no inherent tendency, and each successive player has a greater
tendency to defect than the previous one, down to the last with hN = −1. In
addition to this individual effect, each player can be influenced by the others. For
instance, let us assume that a certain number of players np have each a capacity
pi to punish defecting players they consider at fault, of which there are nf . The
total punishment befalling a defector among the nf is then pi = pinp/nf . The
balance of payoffs for a given player considered at fault is now
Hi = pi + hi = pi
np
nf
−
i− 2
N − 2
. (2)
(Note that np and nf can change with time, although for clarity we refrain
from making this explicit.) This is also the balance Hi for players who are
cooperating but who would become at fault if they were to defect (with the
small adjustment that, since such a player would presumably not punish herself,
she has pi = n˜p/n˜f , where n˜p and n˜f are the values of np and nf that there
would be if this player defected). Meanwhile, for players not considered at fault
irrespectively of their strategies, pi = 0.
This simple model captures the features of social dilemmas required to illus-
trate how targeted punishment can work, without sacrificing generality by going
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into the details of a given game. However, the parameter pi could be adjusted
to describe, for instance, the public goods game with specific punishment costs.
Which players can punish, and whom should they punish? In many real
situations, it is only possible for cooperators to punish defectors. In this case,
np is equal to the number of cooperators, nc, at any given time. For now we
shall focus on this case, although the possibility of defectors also punishing other
defectors is discussed below.1 As to who should be punished, this is in fact the
only “rule” that the community has freedom to determine – or, more precisely,
that those in a position to punish can determine. The simplest (and arguably
fairest) rule would be for all defectors to be punished. In this case, nf is equal
to the number of defectors, nf = N − nc.
We run computer simulations of the situation described above for N = 200
players (roughly the number of countries in the world) and compute the average
proportion of cooperators, ρ = nc/N , once a stationary state has been reached.
Figure 1 shows this proportion on a colour scale for a range of the two param-
eters, β (rationality), and pi (punishment). In panel (a), we see that for almost
all parameter combinations global cooperation is obtained. However, there is an
important detail: for these simulations, we have set the initial strategy of every
player to ‘cooperate’. The lesson we can learn, therefore, is that in these condi-
tions global cooperation can be maintained once it has been achieved. But what
about if the initial strategies are all set to ‘defect’? In Figure 1b we show the
results for this case. There is now a much smaller region of global cooperation,
requiring significantly higher levels of punishment pi than are necessary simply
to maintain cooperation. Interestingly, while a certain degree of rationality β
is needed to achieve cooperation, thereafter the minimum punishment enabling
cooperation increases with rationality, implying that some degree of randomness
in the selection of strategies is globally beneficial.
What is happening here? To gain a better understanding of the phenomenon,
we consider the fixed points of the dynamics. These are values ρ∗ such that, when
ρ = ρ∗, the subsequent value to which the system naturally evolves is, again, ρ∗.
A fixed point can be either stable or unstable: if a small deviation from ρ∗ would
tend to return the system to ρ∗, it is stable; whereas it is unstable if random
fluctuations around this point are amplified and the system driven to some other
value of ρ. In Methods we analyse the fixed points and their stability, and show
the results for three different combinations of parameters in the bottom panels
of Figure 1. Figure 1c corresponds to a level of punishment pi = 0.4. The lines
show the fixed points as functions of β, with stable fixed points plotted in red
and unstable ones in blue. Arrows show the direction in which the system will
tend to evolve depending on the value of ρ (away from unstable fixed points
and towards stable ones). First of all, we observe that global defection (ρ = 0)
is always unstable, while global cooperation (ρ = 1) is stable for any β > 0.
There are two further fixed points, one stable and one unstable. If the system
begins with sufficient cooperators that ρ is above the unstable one, it will evolve
towards global cooperation. However, if the initial ρ is below this, evolution will
be towards the other stable fixed point. This explains the difference between
the top two panels, where global cooperation is observed when all players begin
1There is no reason, in principle, why defectors should not be able to retaliate by punishing
the punishers. However, since the focus here is on situations where all players recognise
the collective benefits of cooperation, as in the case of global warming, we shall leave this
possibility unexplored.
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Figure 1. (a) Stationary proportion of cooperators, ρ, for a range of
rationality, β, and punishment, pi, from Monte Carlo simulations of the model
when all cooperators punish all defectors, and initially all N = 200 players
cooperate. (b) As before, but now all players initially defect. (c) Fixed points
of the dynamics against β, when pi = 0.4; stable fixed points are depicted in
red, unstable ones in blue. (d) As in (b), but with pi = 0.6. (e) Fixed points of
the dynamics against pi, when β = 2.5. (The fixed-point analysis is described
in Methods.)
cooperating, but not when they start off defecting. Figure 1d shows a situation
of higher punishment, pi = 0.6. There are now still regions of β for which the
stable fixed point at low ρ acts as a trap when all players begin defecting; but
an interval has appeared in which there is an uninterrupted path from ρ = 0 to
ρ = 1. This corresponds to the region in the top right panel where cooperation
can be observed at this pi for intermediate values of β. Finally, in Figure 1e we
set β = 2.5 and plot the fixed points against pi. Again we see that, for pi below
a certain value, there is a stable fixed point at low ρ which acts as a trap, while
high enough pi will ensure global cooperation irrespectively of initial conditions.
2.2 Paths to cooperation
As noted above, players with the ability to punish others have the freedom to
decide whom to punish. It may seem fairest to punish all defectors equally, but
when these are numerous this approach dissipates the total punishing capacity.
Consider, instead, the following rule. A defecting player i is only deemed at
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Figure 2. Diagrams illustrating the two strategies of targeted punishment
described in the main text: (a) is the ‘single file’ strategy, and (b) is the
‘groups’ strategy with groups of size ν = 3 and a threshold θ = 2/3. Players
are arranged from most to least inherently cooperative; those currently
cooperating are shown in red and those defecting in blue. A black arrow
indicates a defector who is considered at fault (and therefore liable to be
punished) according to the strategy, while a grey arrow signals a cooperator
who would be at fault if she were defecting.
fault at time t if the one immediately before her in the ordering, player i −
1, cooperates at time t. This rule, which we shall refer to as the ‘single file
strategy’, is illustrated in Figure 2a. According to this view, the number of
players considered at fault, nf , will be smaller than the total number of defectors
when these are in the majority, while the scenario becomes identical to the
previous one when almost all the players cooperate. In Figure 3a we show the
results for simulations in which punishers adopt this strategy. As in Figure 1b,
all players initially defect. The region of global cooperation is now significantly
larger than in Figure 1b: harmony can be achieved at much lower values of
punishment pi, particularly if rationality β is high. Because at any one time
only a very small number of defectors are deemed at fault, even a low level of
punishment is sufficient to make them cooperate. As each new player switches
strategy, it passes on the burden of responsibility to another one down the line,
resulting in a cascade of defectors becoming cooperators. A secondary effect
is that, as the ranks of cooperators grow, the total punishment they are able
to inflict increases, although as we show in Supplementary Material this is not
essential for the mechanism to work.
The single file strategy allows for global cooperation to ensue from widespread
defection in situations where this would not have been possible with equal al-
location of punishment. Thus, selecting only certain players for culpability can
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Figure 3. (a) As Figure 1b (all players initially defect), but now the ‘single
file’ strategy is applied. (b) As in Figure 1b, but under the ‘groups’ strategy
with ν = 10 and θ = 80%. (See the main text and Figure 2 for descriptions of
these strategies.) (c) Difference between Figure 1a (all players initially
cooperate) and Figure 3a. (d) Difference between Figure 1a and Figure 3b. (e)
Speed v = N/τ , where τ is the number of time steps required to achieve global
cooperation, for the situation in Figure 3a. (f) Speed v for the case of Figure
3b.
provide an escape route from the tragedy of the commons. However, this is not
necessarily the best rule to ensure such an outcome; in fact, there are regions
at low pi and β where, according to Figure 1, global cooperation is sustainable,
yet not achievable via this route. So consider now the following arrangement,
which we can call the ‘groups strategy’. Players are allocated to groups of size
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ν, such that players i = 1, ...ν belong to the first group, i = ν + 1, ...2ν to the
second, and so forth. A defector belonging to group m is deemed to be at fault
at time t if and only if at least a proportion θ of the players in group m − 1
cooperate at time t. This strategy is illustrated in Figure 2b. In Figure 3b we
show simulation results for this scenario, with 20 groups of ν = 10 players and
a threshold of θ = 80%, where, as before, all players begin defecting. (To set
the process off, players in the first group are always considered at fault if they
defect.) An even greater region of parameter space now corresponds to global
cooperation, leaving only very low levels of pi and β out of reach. For a given
number of players, N , and set of inherent tendencies, hi, there will be optimal
rules, or ‘targeted punishment strategies’, which come closest to ensuring global
cooperation for any values of rationality and punishment. (Note that the single
file strategy is an instance of the more general groups strategy when ν = 1 and
θ = 100%.)
Figures 3c and 3d show the difference, ∆ρ, between the maximum density
of cooperators achievable (i.e. when all players initially cooperate), and the
results of Figures 3a and 3b, respectively. About 12% of the parameter space
shown corresponds to situations where cooperation is possible but not achievale
via the single file strategy. For the groups strategy, however, little over 3% of
the potential parameter space remains out of reach. Another aspect to take
into account when comparing punishment strategies is the speed with which
cooperation can be achieved. Figures 3e and 3f show the quantity v = N/τ for
each rule, where τ is the number of time steps required to achieve cooperation.
In most of the parameter range, cooperation is achieved sooner with ν = 10
than with ν = 1.
As remarked above, in many real situations it is only the cooperators who are
seen as having the ability or legitimacy to punish defectors. However, defectors
too could, in principle, punish other defectors, even if this may be regarded as
somewhat unfair. For instance, in many societies criminals pay value added
tax on their purchases, thereby contributing indirectly to the penal system. In
Supplementary Material we perform the same analysis for the case in which
np = N ; that is, all players contribute to the punishment of defectors. The
dynamics is qualitatively similar to the situation in which only cooperators can
punish, the main difference being that global cooperation can, unsurprisingly,
ensue from lower levels of punishment per player. If, on the other hand, only a
fraction a of cooperators were to punish, the situation would be as in Figures 1
and 3 after rescaling pi → api.
The situations thus far examined involve a predisposition to cooperate, hi,
with a specific functional form; and the punishing strategies assume that their
precise ordering is known. In Supplementary Material we relax these constraints
by adding a Gaussian noise to hi, and randomly switching the ordering of 25%
of players with randomly chosen counterparts. We find that both punishing
strategies described above are quite robust to these changes: the single file
strategy is the most robust at high levels of both punishment and rationality,
while the groups strategy is superior at low values of these parameters.
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3 Discussion
Punishment has been shown to maintain cooperation in many social dilemma
settings [18, 25], and it is generally assumed that such punishment should be
fair [27]. However, in situations of entrenched defection, the society’s punishing
capacity can become too dilute to have any effect if applied equally to all defec-
tors. The message of this paper is that even in such situations there can exist
strategies of ‘targeted punishment’ which allow a few initial punishers to shift
a large number of defectors into a state of global cooperation.
The paths to cooperation described above would seem to rely heavily on the
possibility of punishment. Since punishing a defector presumably has some cost,
such an act in itself constitutes a kind of cooperation. This is not necessarily a
problem, given that humans and governments alike are wont to engage in “costly
punishment” in a variety of settings [18, 25, 32]. But, in any case, punishment
is only one potential mechanism which might give rise to a term pi with the
characteristics we have here assumed. For instance, a determining factor in
human behaviour often seems to be the anticipation of how one’s choices might
affect those of others [21]. We know that our recycling, voting or travelling by
bicycle will have little impact on the world per se, but we may rationally engage
in these activities in the hope that others will follow suite. If the rules of the
game have been set up in such a way that our actions determine whether the
next player in line will be expected to honour her conditional commitments,
what seemed like a grain of sand in the desert becomes a grain of sand in an
avalanche. If one imagines all eyes turned towards the single player whose turn
it is to cooperate – or to the single small group of such players – it is easy to
see how one might be more inclined to cooperate than in a world of distributed
responsibility.
One could argue that establishing the initial ordering would be an obstacle of
similar magnitude to achieving cooperation directly. This may be the case when
the players are alike in all respects. But an acknowledgement of heterogeneity
might break this symmetry in a way acceptable to all, especially if there exist
objective measures to establish, say, the effort each player would have to make to
cooperate. Furthermore, a player fairly well inclined to cooperate but deterred
by the mass of less well-predisposed companions might happily adopt an early
position in the hope that the mechanism may bear fruit; while staunch defectors
can leave the burden of responsibility to others by being placed further down
the line, with the knowledge that they would only be called upon to participate
if global cooperation were nigh. In any case, if the tool for convincing players to
cooperate is some form of punishment, only the punishers need agree on whom
to punish at any given time.
It is worth reflecting that much social organization as we know it is in fact
achieved though an implicit arrangement of targeted punishment. Even the
most despotic tyrants cannot personally punish all dissenters. But if they can
exert power over a small group of underlings, who in turn manage their sub-
ordinates, and so on down a hierarchical pyramid, top-down control can occur.
Similarly, most of us are subject to the judging gazes of only our immediate
friends and neighbours, yet this can be enough to ensure conformity to various
social conventions.
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3.1 Targeted punishment in practice
Could a strategy of targeted punishment be implemented by the international
community to escape from global tragedies of the commons, such as anthro-
pogenic climate change? Ideally, countries might sign up voluntarily to small
groups, each of which would in turn be allocated a position in an ordering. Al-
ternatively, the ordering and groupings could follow automatically from some
objective measure, such as income per capita. Small nations already making
significant yet unsung progress, or particularly vulnerable ones, could use their
early positioning to draw attention to their situations in the hope of having a
wider effect. Others may initially welcome the temporary lifting of responsibility
by signing up to a group further down the line, but find themselves obliged to
cooperate once the spotlight came their way. Finally, even the biggest polluters
would run out of excuses once a majority of other groups were cooperating.
Some combination of sanctions and incentives could be arranged, although the
mere fact of the whole world’s eyes being focused on a small number of defectors
at any one time might prove a sufficient inducement in many cases. We have
already tried signing up to commitments, enshrining these in law, privatising
the commons through carbon trading schemes – yet yearly global CO2 emissions
are now about 30% higher than when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted [4, 5].
Perhaps it is time for a new approach.
4 Methods
According to Eqs. (1) and (2), the probability that player i will cooperate at
time step t+ 1 is
Pi(t+ 1) =
1
2
tanh
[
β
(
pi
np(t)
nf (t)
−
i− 2
N − 2
)]
+
1
2
,
where np(t) and nf (t) are the numbers of punishing and punishable players,
respectively, at time t. If ρt = nc(t)/N is the proportion of cooperating players
at time t, let us define the expected proportion of cooperating players at time
t + 1: G(ρt) = ρt+1 (this is an expected value in the sense that the average of
ρt+1 over many independent realizations of the system will converge to ρt+1).
We can then write
G(ρt) = 〈Pi(t+ 1)〉,
where 〈·〉 stands for an average over all players. For the case where np = nc and
np = N − nc (all defectors are punished by, and only by, all cooperators), this
becomes
G(ρt) =
1
2
〈
tanh
[
β
(
pi
ρt
1− ρt
−
i− 2
N − 2
)]〉
+
1
2
. (3)
Any value ρ∗ such that G(ρ∗) = ρ∗ will be a fixed point of the dynamics.
Fluctuations around ρ∗ will tend to dampen out if
dG(ρt)
dρt
ρ∗ ∈ (−1, 1), (4)
whereas if the absolute value of the derivative is larger than one, the fixed point
will be unstable, since even an infinitesimal fluctuation will drive the system to
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a different state. The bottom panels of Figure 1 are obtained by solving Eqs.
(3) and (4) numerically. More generally, for any ρt, it is possible to determine
whether the system can be expected to evolve towards more or fewer cooperators
by the sign of G(ρt)− ρt.
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In the main text we describe two strategies of targeted punishment which
punishers can adopt when most of the players are defecting:
• Single file: A defector is considered at fault if and only if the player im-
mediately before her in the ordering is currently cooperating.
• Groups: A defector is considered at fault if and only if at least a fraction θ
of the players making up the group immediately before hers in the ordering
are currently cooperating.
The ordering should arrange players in descending order of their net perceived
payoff hi – that is, in increasing order of their temptation to defect. We show
that by focusing their punishment on defectors considered at fault according to
the rule adopted, punishers can shift a population of defectors towards global
cooperation in many situations where attempting to punish all defectors would
have no appreciable effect. But the generality of these results is limited by
two assumptions: that the number of punishers is proportional to the number
of cooperators; and that the perceived payoffs of players follow a linear form,
which is known to punishers. In this appendix we relax both assumptions and
find that the effectivity of targeted punishment does not depend strongly on
such considerations.
Constant punishment
In the main text, we consider only scenarios in which the number of punishers
is equal to the number of cooperators. If it were, in fact, proportional to the
number of cooperators, this would simply involve a rescaling of the punishment
parameter, pi. But what if all players were punishers, irrespectively of their
individual state of cooperation? Figure S1 shows the situations corresponding to
Figure 1 of the main text, with the difference that now the number of punishers
is np = N at all times. As in the case where only cooperators punish, there
is a large region of parameter space where cooperation is sustainable, but not
achievable when punishment is diluted among all defectors.
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Figure S 1. As Figure 1 of the main text, but with the number of punishers
being equal to the number of players: np = N . (a) All players initially
cooperate. (b) All players initially defect. Bottom panels: Stability diagrams
when pi = 0.2 (c), pi = 0.3 (d), and β = 2.5 (e).
The targeted punishment strategies described above are able to bring about
global cooperation in large regions of the parameter space, as can be seen in
Figure S2 – this figure corresponds to Figure 3 of the main text, with the
difference that here np = N , instead of np = nc. Note that, if we wished to
consider a situation where a fraction a of players where punishers, it would
suffice to rescale the punishment parameter as pi → api in Figures S1 and S2.
Robustness to noise
In the main text we consider situations where player i’s payoff, in the absence
of punishment, is hi = −(i−2)/(N−2), and players are arranged in descending
order of h. In real situations, punishers may not know the payoff perceived by
player i. We therefore corrupt this setting with two sources of noise to gauge
the strategies’ robustness to this imperfect knowledge. We now consider that
i’s payoff is hi = −(i − 2 + ηi)/(N − 2), where the variables ηi are drawn from
a Gaussian with mean zero and variance σ2. We also reshuffle the ordering, by
choosing a fraction f of the N players randomly, and switching their positions
in the ordering with randomly chosen players. Figure S3 shows a setting like
that of Figure 3 of the main text, after we have corrupted the payoffs with a
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Figure S 2. As Figure 3 of the main text, but with the number of punishers
being equal to the number of players: np = N . (a) As Figure S1b (all players
initially defect), but now the ‘single file’ strategy is applied. (b) As in Figure
S1b, but under the ‘groups’ strategy with ν = 10 and θ = 80%. (c) Difference
between Figure S1a (all players initially cooperate) and Figure S2a. (d)
Difference between Figure S1a and Figure S2b. (e) Speed v = N/τ , where τ is
the number of time steps required to achieve global cooperation, for the
situation in Figure S2a. (f) Speed v for the case of Figure S2b.
(quenched) noise set by σ2 = 1, and reshuffled a proportion f = 25% of players.
Although the targeted punishment strategies lose some of their effectivity, there
are still large regions of parameter space where their adoption leads to most
players cooperating.
In Figure S4, we carry out the same corruption of payoffs and of the order-
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Figure S 3. As Figure 3 of the main text, after the payoffs have been
corrupted with a noise drawn from a Gaussian of mean zero and variance
σ2 = 1; and a random proportion f = 25% of players have had their positions
in the ordering switched with other random players. Punishment strategies are
‘single file’ in the panels on the left [(a),(c) and (e)], and ‘groups’ in those on
the right [(b),(d) and (f)]. (a) and (b) Stationary proportion of cooperators, ρ.
(c) and (d) Difference between maximum ρ maintainable [as displayed in
Figure 1(a) of the main tex], and the results of Figures S3a and S3b,
repectively. (e) and (f) Speed v = N/τ , where τ is the number of time steps
required to achieve global cooperation, for the situations in Figures S3a and
S3b, respectively.
ing as in Figure S3, but here we consider the situation where all players are
punishers: np = N . Again, the strategies can be seen to be fairly robust under
4
these conditions.
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Figure S 4. As Figure S2 (all players punish), after the payoffs have been
corrupted with a noise drawn from a Gaussian of mean zero and variance
σ2 = 1; and a random proportion f = 25% of players have had their positions
in the ordering switched with other random players. Punishment strategies are
‘single file’ in the panels on the left [(a),(c) and (e)], and ‘groups’ in those on
the right [(b),(d) and (f)]. (a) and (b) Stationary proportion of cooperators, ρ.
(c) and (d) Difference between maximum ρ maintainable [as displayed in
Figure S1a], and the results of Figures S4a and S4b, repectively. (e) and (f)
Speed v = N/τ , where τ is the number of time steps required to achieve global
cooperation, for the situations in Figures S4a and S4b, respectively.
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